The DRC does not lack minerals. The harder question is what it takes to turn that resource wealth into productive capacity, investment and a functioning industrial economy.
That was the central question explored during “Unlocking the DRC’s Industrial Potential: The A-to-Z Masterclass Strategy”, the opening session of the DRC Critical Minerals & Industrialisation Forum webinar series, held on 23 September 2026.
Chaired by Jonathan Makolo, the two hour discussion brought together three perspectives: mining law and regulation, geology and public policy, investment and industrial strategy.
Me Edmond Cibamba Diata, Chair of the Board at ELITE LAW FIRM SCP, Jonathan Hamisi, Senior Policy Advisor at the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) and Guy Muyambuleno Kioni, CEO of Missang Ltd and Critical Minerals Fellow at MENAF, approached the question from different angles.
Yet their arguments kept converging on the same point: mineral wealth is only the starting point. Industrialisation depends on what happens around it.
For Me Edmond Cibamba Diata, the starting point is the investment environment.
Having taken part in drafting the DRC’s 2002 Mining Code and its 2018 revision, he argued that the country has a legal framework capable of supporting investment and industrialisation. The greater challenge is how consistently that framework is applied.
An industrial project is financed over a long horizon, often 15 to 20 years or more. Investors therefore need clarity on their obligations, the fiscal cost of a project and the time required to secure each authorisation.
From that perspective, three conditions become critical: predictability, institutional coherence and execution.
Changes in the rules can disrupt projects designed around long term assumptions. Several administrations interpreting the same provisions differently can create uncertainty. And even well designed legislation has limited impact if implementation is inconsistent.
As Me Cibamba Diata put it, industrialisation is not achieved through announcements alone. It requires deadlines that are met, infrastructure that is available and monitoring that can be measured.
The discussion also examined the tools already available to encourage local value addition: the requirement to process ore on national territory, restrictions on the export of copper and cobalt concentrates and market mechanisms such as cobalt export quotas.
The broader question is how these instruments can encourage greater value creation while keeping an investment environment capable of supporting projects over the long term.
Jonathan Hamisi shifted the discussion from regulation to strategy.
The DRC features prominently in other countries’ critical minerals strategies because of its position in global supply chains. But Hamisi challenged the assumption that the country should simply reproduce lists developed elsewhere.
Criticality, he argued, depends on the economy, industries, technologies and strategic objectives a country is trying to protect or develop.
That leads to a more fundamental question: critical for whom, and critical to what?
For the DRC, a critical minerals strategy needs to connect four areas: geology, industrial policy, the enabling environment and human capital.
That means understanding what the country produces today and could produce tomorrow; identifying the industries it wants to build; addressing energy, infrastructure, financing, environmental management and market access; and developing the skills required to support those ambitions.
The distinction was captured in one of the clearest lines of the discussion:
“A critical minerals list tells you what matters. A critical minerals strategy tells you what you intend to do about it.”
For the DRC, industrialisation cannot begin and end with naming minerals such as cobalt, copper, lithium or tantalum. The country has to work backwards from the industries it wants to build and identify the energy, infrastructure, technology, skills, financing and markets required to make them viable.
If one issue surfaced again and again, it was energy.
Hamisi pointed to the gap between installed generation capacity and the electricity actually available to industry. The Autorité de Régulation de l’Électricité reported about 3,650 MW of installed capacity in 2024, while actual output on the grid often hovers between 1,500 and 2,000 MW. He also cited a 2025 estimate from the ministry responsible for electricity that the extractive sector alone faces a deficit of about 2,000 MW.
The implication is clear: having energy potential is not the same as having reliable electricity where industry needs it.
Generation needs to be financed and built. Transmission needs to connect production to industrial hubs. Substations need to provide stable power. And electricity needs to be available reliably and at a competitive price.
The same principle applies beyond energy.
The discussion examined the DRC’s mineral hubs, its transport corridors and the role of routes such as the Lobito Corridor and TAZARA in creating greater connectivity and resilience.
For Hamisi, industrialisation therefore requires a corridor approach that connects mineral producing regions with energy, processing capacity, transport, skills and markets.
Guy Muyambuleno Kioni took the discussion one step further.
A processing plant can be an important part of industrial development, but it does not automatically create an industrial ecosystem. As he put it: “Processing alone is not industrialisation.”
For an industry to develop, processing needs to sit within a wider system of energy, infrastructure, skills, technology, entrepreneurship and access to markets.
That also means accepting that the DRC cannot realistically move up every part of every mineral value chain at once.
Kioni argued for a more targeted approach: identify where the DRC has strategic advantages, select the minerals and parts of the value chain where those advantages can be developed, and then decide which markets the resulting products will serve.
Those markets may include the energy transition, electric vehicles and electricity grids, but also defence, aerospace and data centres. The destination market matters because it shapes the type of product, infrastructure, technology and investment required.
The discussion also brought industrialisation back to a fundamental question: who pays for it?
Large industrial projects require substantial capital and long investment horizons. Kioni highlighted the role of catalytic and development finance in moving a project from an initial concept towards bankability.
His example traced that progression: early public support for feasibility work and risk reduction, then development finance and eventually institutional capital.
That creates an important distinction between having an industrial opportunity and having an investable industrial project.
For international investors, he argued, the level of risk is not the decisive issue. Consistency is. Clear regulation, reliable infrastructure, skills and a well presented pipeline of projects all help capital assess and manage risk over the long term.
One of the strongest conclusions was that industrialisation cannot be treated as a mining sector issue alone.
Geology matters. Regulation matters. Energy matters. Infrastructure matters. Skills matter. Capital matters. So do markets, environmental management, responsible mining and security.
The connection between these factors is what turns a mineral deposit into productive economic capacity.
That was also evident in the discussion of artisanal and small scale mining, where Hamisi argued that formalisation cannot simply mean registration or policing. It requires geological knowledge, technical assistance, safer production and processing technology, financing, market access, traceability and an appropriate fiscal framework.
The same principle applies to geological knowledge itself. Hamisi argued that a long term mineral and industrialisation strategy cannot be built around a resource base that is not fully understood, and called for greater public investment in geological mapping.
The opening masterclass did not produce a single formula for industrialisation. Instead, it showed the connections that need to work together.
The DRC has significant mineral resources and energy potential. But those assets only become an industrial advantage when they are supported by predictable policy, functioning institutions, reliable infrastructure and energy, skilled people, access to capital and markets and the geological knowledge needed to plan ahead.
That is perhaps the most important distinction to emerge from the discussion.
The question is no longer simply what minerals the DRC has. It is what the country intends to build around them.
The next session in the series, “The Infrastructure and Industrialisation Development Focus”, takes place on 21 October 2026. It turns to the infrastructure, connectivity and enabling conditions needed to translate the DRC’s mineral potential into lasting industrial capacity.
The DRC Critical Minerals & Industrialisation Forum brings together industry, government and investors to examine the policies, investment pathways and practical conditions needed to build greater value from the country’s critical mineral resources. The webinar series paves the way for the Forum’s return in 2027.
Watch the replay: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqVPZZl3NV0
Register now for the next session: https://streamyard.com/watch/zsAnGTmC9iWz
For more information please contact:
T: +27 21 700 3500
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